REMUNERATION POLICY REPORT

DCC's revised Remuneration Policy ('the Policy') is set out below. As an Irish-incorporated company, DCC is not required to comply with UK regulations that require UK companies to submit their remuneration policies to a binding shareholder vote. In addition, following Brexit, requirements under Irish company law implemented to give effect to the Shareholders Rights Directive II only apply to companies whose shares are admitted to trading on an EU-regulated market. However, the Board recognises the need for our remuneration policies, practices and reporting to reflect best corporate governance practice and has substantially applied these regulations.

As such, we will be submitting the revised Remuneration Policy to an advisory, non-binding vote at the 2024 AGM, reflecting the changes outlined in the Chair's Introduction and set out in detail on pages 133 to 139. Subject to this shareholder approval, the Company intends to operate its remuneration arrangements in line with the proposed new Remuneration Policy, from the date of the 2024 AGM.

The Policy is designed and managed to support a high-performance and entrepreneurial culture, taking into account competitive market positioning.

The Board seeks to align the interests of executive Directors and other senior executives with those of shareholders within the framework set out in the UK Corporate Governance Code ('the Code'). Central to this Policy is the Group's belief in long-term, performance-based incentivisation and the encouragement of share ownership.

The primary Policy objective is to have overall remuneration reflect performance and contribution, while maintaining salary rates and the short-term element of incentive payments that are broadly in line with arrangements for companies of similar size, scale and complexity.

DCC's strategy of fostering entrepreneurship requires well-designed incentive plans that reward the creation of shareholder value through organic and acquisitive growth while maintaining high returns on capital employed, strong cash generation and a focus on sound risk management.

The typical elements of the remuneration package for executive Directors are base salary, pension and other benefits, annual performance-related bonuses and participation in long-term performance plans, which promote the creation of sustainable shareholder value.

The Remuneration Committee seeks to ensure:

- that the Group will attract, motivate and retain individuals of the highest calibre;
- that executives are rewarded in a fair and balanced way for their individual and team contributions to the Group's performance;
- that executives receive a level of remuneration that is appropriate to their scale of responsibility and individual performance;
- that the overall approach to remuneration aligns with the sectors and geographies within which the Group operates and the markets from which it draws its executives; and
- that risk is properly considered in setting remuneration policy and determining remuneration packages.

The Remuneration Committee takes external advice from remuneration consultants on market practice within similar-sized UK-listed and Irish companies to ensure that remuneration remains competitive and structures continue to support the key remuneration policy objectives. Benchmarking data is used to inform remuneration decisions, but does not drive changes.

The Committee is mindful of managing any conflicts of interest. No individual is involved in determining their own remuneration arrangements.

The design of executive Director remuneration concerning the application of the Code is laid out in the table below:

Clarity	Our Remuneration Policy and the approach to its implementation are clearly communicated to shareholders and well understood by participants.
Simplicity	We operate a simple market-aligned salary and benefits structure, with annual and long-term performance-based incentives with payouts linked to only a small number of performance measures.
Risk	We manage risk by carefully setting performance targets in the context of a wide range of reference points. The Committee retains the discretion to moderate outcomes in the context of underlying performance. The senior executive remuneration structure is heavily weighted to longer-term or deferred elements of pay, helping to ensure our pay structure reinforces a long time horizon.
Predictability	There are defined threshold and maximum pay scenarios described on page 138.
Proportionality	Remuneration is weighted towards financial and non-financial performance, measures for which are selected to align with strategy. We set challenging performance targets that are commensurate with the incentive opportunities awarded.
Alignment to culture	The remuneration design aligns closely with DCC's performance culture and values, which reinforce longer-term decision making and collective efforts. Our annual bonus plan includes sustainability/ESG targets.

Element and link to strategy	Operation	Maximum opportunity	Policy changes
BASE SALARY			
Attract and retain skilled and experienced senior executives.	Base salaries are reviewed annually on 1 April. The factors taken into account include: • Role and experience • Company performance • Personal performance • Competitive market practice • Salary increases across the Group • Benchmarking versus companies of similar size and complexity within the UK and Irish markets When setting pay policy, account is taken of movements in pay generally across the Group.	There is no prescribed maximum base salary or maximum annual increase. The general intention is that any increases will align with the increase across the Group's workforce. Increases may be higher in certain circumstances, such as role and responsibility changes or significant market practice changes.	No change
BENEFITS			
To provide market competitive benefits.	Benefits include the use of a company car, life/disability cover, health insurance and club subscriptions.	No maximum level has been set as payments depend on individual circumstances.	No change
PENSION			
To reward sustained contribution.	The executive Directors are eligible to participate in a defined contribution pension scheme (or receive cash in lieu of contributions to a defined contribution pension scheme).	Pension contributions (paid into the defined contribution scheme or paid as cash in lieu) for existing executive Directors are capped at 15% of base salary, in line with the broader workforce. Newly appointed executive Directors will receive pension contributions in line with the broader workforce. Pensionable salary is defined as base salary.	No change

Element and link to strategy	Operation	Maximum opportunity	Policy changes
ANNUAL BONUS			
To reward the achievement of annual performance targets.	Bonus payments to executive Directors are based upon meeting pre-determined targets for several key measures, including Group adjusted operating profit and overall contribution and attainment of strategic objectives. The strategic targets focus on areas such as delivery of strategy, organisational development, IT, investor relations, financing, risk management, sustainability/ESG and talent development/succession planning. The measures, their weighting and the targets are reviewed annually. The Committee determines bonus levels based on actual performance after the year end. The Committee can apply appropriate discretion in specific circumstances regarding determining the bonuses to be awarded. In particular, the Committee has the discretion to reduce bonuses if a pre-determined target return on capital employed is not achieved. Regarding the executive Directors, 33% of any bonus earned, once the appropriate tax and social security deductions have been made, will be invested in DCC shares and made available to them, with accrued dividends, after three years or earlier if their employment terminates. A formal clawback policy is in place for the executive Directors, under which bonuses are subject to clawback for three years in the event of a material restatement of financial statements or other specified events. Further details on the clawback policy are set out on page 136. The Committee has discretion in relation to bonus payments to joiners and leavers.	The maximum bonus potential for the executive Directors, permitted under the Policy, is 200% of base salary. The Remuneration Committee will set a maximum to apply for each financial year, which will be disclosed in the Annual Report on Remuneration. A defined target level of performance has been set for which 50% of the maximum bonus is payable.	Corporate failure is being introduced as a stated trigger to the existing malus and clawback provisions attaching to bonus.

Element and link to strategy	Operation	Maximum opportunity	Policy changes
LONG-TERM INCENTIVE PLAN ('LTIP')			
To align the interests of executives with those of the Group's shareholders and to reflect the Group's culture of long-term performance-based incentivisation.	The LTIP provides for the Remuneration Committee to grant nominal cost (€0.25) options to acquire shares to Group employees, including executive Directors. The vesting period is typically three years from the date of grant, with the extent of vesting being determined over three years, based on the performance conditions set out in the Annual Report on Remuneration. The executive Directors have a two-year hold period as a post-vest sale restriction. In addition to the detailed performance conditions, an award will not vest unless the Remuneration Committee is satisfied that the Company's underlying financial performance has shown a sustained improvement in the three-year period since the award date. Vesting will be determined by the Remuneration Committee, in its absolute discretion, based on the performance conditions set out in the Annual Report on Remuneration each year. No re-testing of the performance conditions is permitted. The performance conditions and their relative weighting may be modified by the Remuneration Committee in accordance with the Rules of the LTIP, provided that they remain no less challenging and are aligned with the interests of the Company's shareholders. A formal clawback policy is in place, under which awards are subject to clawback in the event of a material restatement of financial statements or other specified events, including corporate failure. Further details on this clawback policy are set out on page 136.	The market value of the shares subject to the options granted in respect of any accounting period may not normally exceed 250% of base salary. In exceptional circumstances, the market value of the shares subject to the options granted in respect of any accounting period may not exceed 300% of base salary. This higher limit will only be used in exceptional circumstances, for example, in the case of external recruitment.	The normal annual maximum LTIP opportunity to increase from 200% to 250% of salary. There is no change to the existing exceptional award limit of 300% of salary. Corporate failure is being introduced as a stated trigger to the existing malus and clawback provisions attaching to LTIP.

Remuneration Committee Discretion

The discretion available to the Committee in respect of the various elements of executive remuneration is summarised below.

Pay element	Discretion available
Bonus	The Committee can apply appropriate discretion regarding the financial and non-financial/strategic targets in specific circumstances. In particular, the Committee has the discretion to reduce bonuses if a pre-determined target return on capital employed is not achieved.
LTIP	Vesting is determined by the Remuneration Committee, at its absolute discretion, based on certain performance conditions.

Payments from Existing Awards

Subject to the achievement of the applicable performance conditions, executive Directors are eligible to receive payment from any award made prior to the approval and implementation of the Remuneration Policy detailed in this Report.

Clawback Policy

Bonus payments may be subject to clawback for three years from payment in certain circumstances, including:

- a material restatement of the Company's audited financial statements;
- a material breach of applicable health and safety regulations;
- business or reputational damage to the Company or a subsidiary arising from a criminal offence, serious misconduct or gross negligence by the individual executive; or
- corporate failure.

The LTIP allows the Remuneration Committee to reduce or impose further conditions on awards prior to vesting in some circumstances as outlined above.

Remuneration Policy for Recruitment of New Executive Directors

In determining the remuneration package for a new executive Director, the Remuneration Committee would be guided by the principle of offering such remuneration as is required to attract, retain and motivate a candidate with the particular skills and experience required for a role, provided the remuneration package offered is in the best interests of the Company and the shareholders. The Remuneration Committee will generally set a remuneration package in accordance with the terms of the approved Remuneration Policy in force at the time of the appointment. However, the Committee may make payments outside of the Policy if required in particular circumstances and if in the Company's and the shareholders' best interests. Any such payments related to the buyout of variable pay (bonuses or awards) from a previous employer will be based on matching the estimated fair value of that variable pay and will take account of the performance conditions and the time until vesting of that variable pay.

For an internal appointment, any variable pay element awarded in respect of the prior role and any other ongoing remuneration obligations existing prior to appointment would be honoured.

Remuneration Policy for Other Employees

While the Remuneration Committee's specific oversight of individual executive remuneration packages extends only to the executive Directors and a number of senior Group executives, it aims to create a broad policy framework, to be applied by management to senior executives throughout the Group, through its oversight of remuneration structures for other Group and subsidiary senior management and of any major changes in employee benefits structures throughout the Group.

DCC employs 16,600 people in 22 countries. Remuneration arrangements across the Group differ depending on the specific role being undertaken, the industry in which the business operates, the level of seniority and responsibilities, the location of the role and local market practice.

Consultation with Employees

The Remuneration Committee considers wider company pay policies at various meetings throughout the year. The Committee considers these and broader pay practices and trends when making executive Directors' compensation decisions. The Annual Report sets out the relationship between executive Director pay and Group employees average remuneration and how executive Directors' salary increases, and pension contributions align with the broader workforce. A copy of the Annual Report is issued to every business in the Group. Internal communication events, such as town halls, then allow employees to raise any questions that they may have on this and other issues.

Each of our businesses is responsible for engaging with their respective workforces in relation to remuneration. The Committee believes such an approach is suitable in light of DCC's decentralised business model. However, the Committee has oversight of workforce pay and policies at a Group level and at a business unit executive level, which enables it to ensure that the approach taken to executive remuneration is consistent with those workforces.

Given the divergent nature of our businesses, the Committee does not believe that a standardised approach to remuneration is appropriate. However, it does pay particular attention to whether each element of remuneration is consistent with the Company's remuneration philosophy.

Consultation with Shareholders
The Committee engages in dialogue with major shareholders on remuneration matters, particularly in relation to planned significant changes to the Policy. The Committee also takes into account the views of shareholder organisations and proxy voting agencies.

The Committee acknowledges that shareholders have a right to a 'say on pay' by putting the Remuneration Report and the Remuneration Policy, as required, to advisory votes at the AGM.

Exit Payments Policy
The provisions on exit in respect of each of the elements of pay are as follows:

Salary and Benefits
Exit payments are made only in respect of base salary for the relevant notice period. The Committee may, at its discretion, also allow for the payment of benefits (such as payments in lieu of defined contribution pension) for the notice period. The notice period applies to both the Company and the executive in all cases.

Annual Bonus
The Remuneration Committee can apply appropriate discretion in determining the bonuses to be awarded based on actual performance achieved and the period of employment during the financial year.

In relation to deferred bonuses which have been invested in DCC shares, they will be made available on the participant's cessation date, together with accrued dividends.

Long-Term Incentive Plan
To the extent that a share award or option has vested on the participant's cessation date, the participant may exercise the share award or option during a specified period following such a date. In no event may the share award or option be exercised later than the expiry date as defined in the award certificate.

Generally, a share award or option that has not vested on the participant's cessation date immediately lapses.

The Committee would typically exercise its discretion when dealing with a participant who ceases to be an employee because of certain exceptional circumstances e.g. death, injury or disability, redundancy, retirement or any other exceptional circumstances. In such circumstances, any share award or option that has not already vested on the participant's cessation date would be eligible for vesting on a date determined by the Remuneration Committee. The number of shares, if any, in respect of which the share award or option vests would be determined by the Remuneration Committee.

The approach for 'good leavers' is to pro-rate awards based on time served as a proportion of the three-year vesting period. The extent of vesting under the performance conditions will be determined in the usual way at the end of the three-year vesting period.

If a participant ceases to be an employee due to termination of his employment for serious misconduct, each share award and option held by the participant, whether or not vested, will automatically lapse immediately upon the service of notice of such termination, unless the Committee in its sole discretion, determines otherwise.

Pension
The rules of the Company's defined contribution pension scheme contain detailed provisions in respect of the termination of employment.

Service Contracts
Donal Murphy has a service agreement with the Company with a notice period of six months. This service agreement provides that either he or the Company could terminate his employment by giving six months' notice in writing. At its sole discretion, the Company may require that Mr Murphy ceases employment immediately instead of working out the notice period, in which case he would receive compensation in the form of base salary only in respect of the notice period. The service contract also provides for summary termination (i.e. without notice) in a number of circumstances, including material breach or grave misconduct. The service agreement does not include any provisions for compensation due to loss of office, other than the notice period provisions set out above.

Kevin Lucey has a letter of appointment which provides for a six-month notice period. This letter of appointment provides that either he or the Company could terminate his employment by giving six months' notice in writing. At its sole discretion, the company may require that Mr Lucey ceases employment immediately instead of working out the period of notice, in which case he would receive compensation in the form of base salary only in respect of the notice period. The letter of appointment also provides for summary termination (i.e. without notice) in a number of circumstances, including material breach or grave misconduct. The letter of appointment does not include any provisions for compensation for loss of office, other than the notice period provisions set out above.

Scenario Charts

Set out below is an illustration of the potential future remuneration that each executive Director could receive for the year ending 31 March 2025 at minimum, median and maximum performance (assuming (i) a constant share price and (ii) an uplift of 50% in the share price).

As the Directors are paid in euro, the Remuneration Committee considers it appropriate that the figures disclosed in this Report continue to be presented in euro.

Donal Murphy, Chief Executive



Kevin Lucey, Chief Financial Officer



Fixed   Annual Bonus   Long-Term Incentive Plan

Notes:

Minimum Performance comprises:
- Fixed pay – base salary, benefits and retirement benefit expense.
- No annual bonus payout.
- No LTIP vesting.

Median Performance comprises:
- Fixed pay – base salary, benefits and retirement benefit expense.
- 50% annual bonus payout, i.e. 100% of salary.
- 50% vesting of LTIP i.e. 125% of salary for CE and 112.5% of salary for CFO.

Maximum Performance (constant share price) comprises:
- Fixed pay – base salary, benefits and retirement benefit expense.
- 100% annual bonus payout, i.e. 200% of salary.
- 100% vesting of LTIP, i.e. 250% of salary for CE and 225% of salary for CFO.

Maximum Performance (share price + 50%) comprises:
- Fixed pay – base salary, benefits and retirement benefit expense.
- 100% annual bonus payout, i.e. 200% of salary.
- 100% vesting of LTIP and 50% uplift in share price, equating to 375% of salary for CE and 337.5% for CFO.

Share Ownership Guidelines

DCC's Remuneration Policy has at its core a recognition that the spirit of ownership and entrepreneurship is essential to creating long-term high performance. DCC also acknowledges that share ownership is important in aligning the interests of executive Directors and other senior Group executives with those of shareholders.

A set of share ownership guidelines is in place under which the Chief Executive, other executive Directors and other senior Group executives are encouraged to build, over a five-year period from appointment, a shareholding in the Company with a valuation relative to base salary as follows:

Executive	Share ownership guideline (multiple of base salary)
Chief Executive	3 x
Other Executive Directors	2 x
Senior Group Executives	1 x

Compliance with the Share Ownership Guidelines is reviewed annually by the Remuneration Committee. The executive Directors' position as at 31 March 2024 is set out in the Annual Report on Remuneration on page 147.

Post-Employment Share Ownership Requirements

In accordance with the requirements of Provision 36 of the UK Corporate Governance Code, the Remuneration Committee introduced Post-Employment Share Ownership Requirements under which the Chief Executive and other executive Directors are required, after leaving the Group, including through retirement, to maintain a shareholding in the Company for a two-year period, as below:

Executive	Ratio of Share Ownership to Base Salary
Chief Executive	3 x
Other executive Directors	2 x

Base salary will be the Director's base salary in effect at the date of ceasing employment.

For the purposes of these Requirements, share ownership will include shares, vested share options, unvested options no longer subject to performance conditions, deferred bonus share awards, restricted stock awards and any other vested or unvested share awards made under incentive plans operated by the Company which are not subject to performance conditions.

Shares held by a Director's spouse and/or minor children and shares held in any trust for the benefit of the Director and/or their spouse and minor children will be counted towards the share ownership requirement.

The valuation of the shareholdings in the Company will be reviewed at the end of each year based on the closing market price of the Company's shares. If the required ratio fails to be met due to factors other than a decrease in the market price of the Company's shares, the Director will be allowed an additional period of 12 months or such other period as the Remuneration Committee may determine, to bring the shareholding back to the required level.

Policy on External Board Appointments

Executive Directors may accept external non-executive directorships with the Board's prior approval. The Board recognises the benefits that such appointments can bring to the Company and the Director in terms of broadening their knowledge and experience. The executive Directors may retain the fees received for such roles.

Mr Murphy and Mr Lucey do not currently hold any external board appointments.

Policy for Non-executive Directors

Fees	Operation	Maximum Opportunity
The fees paid to non-executive Directors reflect their experience and ability and the time demands of their Board and Board Committee duties. A basic non-executive Director fee is paid for Board membership. Additional fees are paid to the chairs of Board Committees, to the Board Chair, to the Senior Independent Director and to the Workforce Engagement Director. Additional fees may be paid in respect of Company advisory boards.	The remuneration of the Board Chair is determined by the Remuneration Committee for approval by the Board. The Board Chair absents himself from the Committee meeting while this matter is being considered. The remuneration of the other non-executive Directors is determined by the Board Chair and the Chief Executive for approval by the Board. The fees are reviewed annually, taking account of any changes in responsibilities and the level of fees in a range of comparable Irish and UK companies.	No prescribed maximum annual increase. In accordance with the Articles of Association, shareholders set the maximum aggregate ordinary remuneration (basic fees, excluding chair fees and additional fees). The current limit of €950,000 was set at the 2023 AGM. Non-executive Directors do not participate in the Company's LTIP or receive any pension benefits from the Company.

Non-executive Directors' Letters of Appointment

The terms and conditions of appointment of non-executive Directors are set out in their letters of appointment. The letters of appointment are available for inspection at the Company's registered office during normal office hours and at the AGM of the Company.